Friday 13th November, 2026
The Supreme Court (SC) has determined that the Protection of the State from Terrorism Bill (PSTB) can be passed by a simple parliamentary majority subject to four amendments at the Committee Stage. The amendments include requiring police applications for extended custody, replacing the Court of Appeal with the Supreme Court for judicial oversight, deleting a redundant provision and clarifying the scope of executive orders subject to judicial review. The SC has rejected arguments that the PSTB is essentially a ‘PTA Plus’, observing that it contains significant improvements over the existing Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA).
Interestingly, the SC has said it agrees with “the submission of the Additional Solicitor General that the provisions of this Bill [PSTB] must be assessed on the safeguards actually contained in it rather than on hypotheses that the relevant officers charged with the powers under the Bill may disregard those safeguards”. The SC has also included in its determination a chart, whose contents it says would show how the PSTB has specifically provided for safeguards and judicial oversight to prevent the abuse of executive power. It has said that having regard to the above provisions in the PSTB it is unable to accept the submission of the Petitioners that the provisions of the Bill lack the judicial oversight and adequate checks and balances against any possible abuse of powers it has conferred on the Executive. This is the opinion of the SC, but the critics of the PSTB are convinced otherwise. It is said that the proof of the pudding is in the eating, and we will see whether the so-called safeguards are robust enough to prevent the abuse of the proposed security law.
The government knows more than one way to shoe a horse. It stands accused of having sought to smuggle some of the most draconian features of the PTA into the POCB, while claiming to be committed to repealing the former. The proposed legislation appears to reproduce several of the PTA’s most notorious provisions, including the admissibility of confessions made in police custody and prolonged detention under executive authority, while extending extraordinary powers to a wide range of offences. In effect, the repeal of one repressive law could become a charade if its objectionable features were resurrected in another guise.
Judicial sanction alone does not make a Bill widely acceptable, politically legitimate or democratically desirable. One may recall that the 13th Amendment survived Supreme Court scrutiny, yet the JVP, now the principal constituent of the ruling NPP, took up arms in a futile bid to scuttle it. That amendment plunged the country into a bloodbath. The 18th Amendment, too, received judicial clearance, but it was widely criticised for consolidating presidential power, dismantling important checks and balances and abolishing the presidential term limit. Several of its objectionable features were subsequently reversed by the 19th Amendment. The 20th Amendment restored the executive powers of the President curtailed by the 19th Amendment and removed the disqualification that had prevented dual citizens, including Basil Rajapaksa, from entering Parliament. Parliament had to introduce the 21st Amendment to reverse the 20th Amendment. Clearly, judicial approval is no substitute for public scrutiny, democratic accountability and sound legislative judgment. The 22nd Amendment, which extended the retirement ages of superior court judges, including the serving ones, also illustrates how judicial clearance does not necessarily translate into wide acceptability. The measure encountered strong opposition not only from the Bar Association of Sri Lanka but also from internationally respected professional bodies, including the Commonwealth Lawyers’ Association, LAWASIA and the International Association of Judges, over concerns about judicial independence and public confidence in the administration of justice. Similarly, although the PSTB may be passed with a simple parliamentary majority, it will continue to attract criticism from its critics, including UN human rights experts, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, unless its objectionable provisions are substantially revised.
The government would do well to withdraw both the PSTB and the POCB, conduct meaningful stakeholder consultations and redraft them in conformity with international human rights standards. There is little merit in enacting laws that are constitutionally permissible but remain fundamentally at odds with international obligations and democratic principles.
